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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EMILIO ORTIZ, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION 
(SELF-INSURED) and SECOND 
INJURY FUND, 
Defendants/Respondents 
Case No. 8705727-CA 
Priority No. 6 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION 
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM DENIAL 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISS HON 
OF PLAINTIFF/ 
OF ORDER 
OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether this court should give 
the Industrial Commission's findings sincj 
supports the Industrial Commission's det 
current disability is not due to an indust 
II. Whether the Industrial Commissi 
Ortiz a hearing on objections to the Medil 
- 1 -
rtiaximum deference t o 
e substantial evidence 
e^ rmination that Ortiz' 
rial accident? 
properly denied 
cal Panel Report? 
on 
III. Whether the Odd-Lot Doctrine is irrelevant to this 
appeal since the Industrial Commission never reached the issue 
of permanent total disability because Ortiz had no present 
disability arising out of any industrial accident? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The determinative statute is the 1982 amendment to Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (Supp. 1987), a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum "A." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
Ortiz claims permanent total disability benefits under the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition by the 
Industrial Commission: 
1. On April 9, 1980, the Industrial Commission of Utah 
("Commission") entered its Order, awarding plaintiff Emilio 
Ortiz ("Ortiz") workers' compensation benefits arising out of 
an industrial accident which occurred on February 19, 1976. 
(R. at 172-181.) 
2. On October 30, 1984, Ortiz filed an application for 
permanent total disability which he alleges arose out of his 
February 19, 1976 industrial accident. (R. at 204.) 
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ob] 
3. On December 18, 1984, a medical 
evaluate the medical aspects of the Orti 
total disability. (R. at 444.) 
4. On January 28, 1986, the Medica 
Report, concluding that Ortiz failed to 
ficant progression of his industrial back 
1976. (R. at 449-52.) See Addendum "B. 
5. On March 7, 1986, Ortiz filed 
Medical Panel Report and requested a medti 
rehabilitation evaluation. (R. at 453-
6. On March 24, 1986, Administrat 
Allen issued his Findings of Fact and 
Order, denying Ortiz' request and cone 
for permanent total disability did not 
February 19, 1976 industrial accident. 
Addendum "C." 
7. On April 18, 1986, Ortiz filed 
contending that he was entitled to a med 
his objections to the Medical Panel Repo 
8. The Industrial Commission deni 
Review on June 19, 1986, concluding that 
his application for permanent total dis 
necessary. (R. at 472-74.) See Addendurh 
9. On November 25, 1987, Ortiz fi 
and/or Motion and Memorandum in support 
panel was appointed to 
|z claim for permanent 
1 Panel issued its 
demonstrate any signi-
disability since 
54 
ive 
Cone 
:lud 
at 
.ed 
>ab 
-3-
jections to ~he 
cal panel hearing and 
.) 
Law Judge Timothy C, 
lusions of Law and 
ing that Ortiz' claim 
ise from the 
(R. at 456-59.) See 
a Motion for Review, 
Jical panel hearing on 
t. (R. at 465-71.) 
Ortiz' Motion for 
no further hearing on 
ility benefits was 
"D." 
a Notice of Appeal 
f Motion to Reopen 
ltd 
and/or Reconsider the Commission Order. (R. at 497-500 and 
502.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in the Brief of Appellant 
is incomplete and misleading. Ortiz also cites as "fact" 
unsupported statements. Accordingly, Kennecott Copper 
Corporation ("Kennecott") submits the following statement of 
facts to supplement and clarify the record: 
1. On February 19, 1976, Ortiz was injured in the course 
of his employment with Kennecott, suffering an injury to his 
back while lifting a railroad tie weighing about 100 pounds. 
(R. at 21-23 and 173.) 
2. Ortiz was awarded permanent partial disability bene-
fits for the 1976 industrial accident. The permanent partial 
impairment attributable to Ortiz' pre-existing back degener-
ation and a spinal fusion was found to be 20% (R. at 450.) 
However, the Medical Panel concluded that the permanent partial 
impairment attributable to the February 19, 1976 industrial 
accident was only 2%. (R. at 450.) 
3. In 1980, Administrative Law Judge, Joseph C. Foley 
awarded Ortiz a 5% disability rating for his 1976 industrial 
accident, which only differed 5% from the impairment that Ortiz 
claimed resulted from the 1976 industrial accident. (R. at 
177, 449, 452 and 494.) 
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4. Numerous physicians concluded tl[iat Ortiz did not 
suffer any impairment from his 1976 industrial accident. Dr. 
Hargreaves gave Ortiz a "0 rating as far as any industrial 
permanent physical impairment." (R. at 449.) Dr. Jeff 
Rohlfing did not give Ortiz an increased 
need to change the 
at 34); 
ability due to his employment. (R. at 4^0.) In 1986, Drs. 
McEntire and Millet concluded from their examination of Ortiz 
that his industrial disability has not increased since 1979 
(R. at 452.) Dr. Boyd Holbrook agreed with McEntire and 
Millet's examination results and felt no 
opinion or the rating. (R. at 450.) 
5. Since 1951, Ortiz has suffered Numerous non-employment 
related back injuries, including: 
(a) a slip and fall in 1951 (R| 
(b) an automobile accident in 1957 (R. at 36); 
(c) an excavation injury in 19^7 (R. at 37); 
(d) a strain in 1958 (R. at 37; 
(e) a slip and fall in 1961 (R| 
(f) numerous other back injuries between 1961 and 
1969 (R. at 38-39); 
(g) many injuries caused by exertion in moving cars 
(R. at 38, 39); 
(h) a fall in 1969 (R. at 39); 
(i) automobile accidents occurring between 1970 and 
1975, one of which was a hit and run accident in which Ortiz 
was hit by a car. (R. at 39-41.) 
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percentage of dis-
at 37); 
and 
6. Ortiz returned to work at Kennecott from his 1976 
industrial accident on May 7, 1979. He continued working at 
Kennecott from May 7, 1979 until he was injured in a non-
employment automobile accident on April 3, 1983. (R. at 232 
and 264.) 
7. On April 3, 1983, while driving to work, Ortiz* car 
spun three or four times on black ice and skidded into a 
ditch. As a result of this accident, Ortiz underwent hospital-
ization, medical treatment and therapy for serious back 
injuries. (R. 250-53, and 450.) 
8. On May 20, 1983 Ortiz was involved in another 
automobile accident. A car behind him failed to stop and 
rear-ended the vehicle which Ortiz was driving. Ortiz was 
hospitalized again and received additional medical treatment 
and therapy for back injuries. (R. at 253-56, and 450.) 
9. Although Ortiz characterizes the 1983 automobile 
accidents as being "relatively minor" (Appellant's brief at p. 
4.) Ortiz previously described the accidents as being "serious 
in nature" (R. at 418 and 473-74). Both accidents required 
hospitalization. (R. at 251-256.) Since these automobile 
accidents, Ortiz has not returned to work. (R. at 232 and 264.) 
10. The reason that Ortiz stopped reporting to work on 
April 7, 1983 was because of back injuries sustained in the 
1983 car accidents. (R. at 264.) 
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11. On July 17, 1984, Ortiz filed an application with the 
Industrial Commission, seeking permanent total disability, 
allegedly arising out of the industrial accident of 
February 19, 1976. (R. at 204.) 
12. Kennecott denied Ortiz' claim oh November 19, 1984, 
contending that any current disability resulted from the 1983 
automobile accidents. (R. at 206-07.) 
13. Although Ortiz states that his medical expert's 
testimony substantiates the claim that Ortiz is "permanently 
and totally disabled primarily due to his industrial accident," 
(Appellant's brief at p. 8, 1f 8), the Record fails to support 
such contention. 
14. The portions of the Record relifed upon by Ortiz to 
establish permanent and total disability simply reiterate the 
percentages of impairment suffered by Mr. Ortiz in 1976 and 
speculate about what might have occurred if Ortiz had not had 
the 1983 automobile accidents. (R. at 4p6-59; and 472-73.) 
15. The Record does not contain any statement by Dr. 
Hebertson that Ortiz is permanently and totally disabled 
"primarily due tc any industrial accident." (R. at 273-276.) 
Rather, the record demonstrates that eveji Dr. Hebertson, Ortiz' 
treating physician, felt that Ortiz' current disability was a 
result of the 1983 automobile accidents 
16. On February 20, 1986, the medickl aspects of Ortiz' 
claim for permanent total disability werp referred to a Medical 
Panel. (R. 448.) 
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(R. at 459.) 
17. On January 28, 1986, the Medical Panel issued their 
report; aicknowledging that they had considered the opinion and 
medical records of Dr. Hebertson. The Medical Panel Report 
concluded that: 
(A) Ortiz failed to demonstrate by objec-
tive physical findings or x-ray findings any 
significant progression of his 1976 industrial 
injury; 
(B) Ortiz has not been temporarily and 
totally disabled as a result of the 1976 
industrial injury since May 6, 1979 when he 
returned to work; and 
(C) Ortiz' automobile accidents did not 
have any relation to his industrial injury and 
his industrial disability has not increased since 
1979. 
(R. at 449-52, 473.) 
18. Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen adopted the 
findings of the Medical Panel and concluded that the 
preponderance of medical evidence supports the Medical Panel's 
finding that Ortiz' current disability is not due to the 1976 
industrial accident. (R. at 459.) 
19. The Industrial Commission upheld Judge Allen's deci-
sion. They concluded that there was little if any conflict 
between the opinions of Dr. Hebertson and the Medical Panel and 
that the evidence did not support a finding that any present 
disability resulted from the 1976 industrial accident. (R. at 
472-75.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court will not disturb the findings and orders of the 
Industrial Commission unless they are arbitrary, capricious and 
contrary to the evidence. See Rushton vj. Gelco Express, 732 
P.2d 109, 110 (Utah 1986). Because substantial evidence 
demonstrates that Ortiz' current disability did not result from 
any industrial accident, the Commission'^ findings and Order 
should not be displaced. 
Because there is no substantial confjLict or lack or clarity 
in the evidence in the instant case, no Rearing on objections 
to the Medical Panel Report is necessary! 
procedural amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 
instant application for workers' compensation benefits and 
relieves the Commission of the burdensom^ obligation of 
conducting unnecessary hearings. 
Because Ortiz' present disability, d:j.d not result from any 
industrial accident, the application of tphe Odd-Lot Doctrine is 
not an issue properly before this Court 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 
NOT BE DISPLACED. 
The Utah Supreme Court explained the 
for review of Industrial Commission case^ 
-9-
Thus, the 1982 
35-1-77 governs the 
FINDINGS SHOULD 
appropriate standard 
in Blaine v. 
Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1985), 
concluding that "the Commission's findings are not to be 
displaced in the absence of a showing that they are arbitrary 
and capricious." In Blaine, the Supreme Court referred to the 
prior case of Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1981), declaring that: 
[I]t is apparent that this Court's function in 
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a strictly 
limited one in which the question is not whether the 
Court agrees with the Commission's findings or whether 
they are supported by a preponderance of evidence. 
Instead, the reviewing Court's inquiry is whether the 
Commission's findings are "arbitrary or capricious," 
or "wholly without cause," or contrary to the "one 
[inevitable] conclusion from the evidence," or without 
"any substantial evidence" to support them. Only then 
should the Commission's findings be displaced. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 890. Accordingly, this Court "give[s] maximum deference 
to the basic facts determined by the agency, which will be 
sustained if there is evidence of any substance that can be 
reasonably regarded as supporting the determination made." 
(Emphasis added.) Wilson v. Industrial Commission, 73 5 P. 2d 
403, 403 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial 
Commission, 732 P.2d 508-509 (Utah 1987)). 
A. The Evidence Amply Supports The Industrial 
Commission's Findings. 
Although Ortiz suffered an industrial accident in 1976, the 
evidence amply demonstrates that any present disability is not 
a result of his 1976 industrial accident. 
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In reviewing Ortiz' back condition and related claims for 
permanent total disability, the Medical Panel noted that 
numerous physicians gave Ortiz a 0 ratinb for permanent 
physical impairment due to his employment. (R. at 449-50). 
Nevertheless, the Medical Panel gave Ortjiz a 2% rating for 
impairment attributable to his 1976 industrial accident. (R. 
at 450.) The Administrative Law Judge cpmpromised the dispute, 
giving Ortiz a 5% rating of impairment attributable to the 1976 
industrial accident. (R. at 452.) 
In 1986 the Medical Panel concluded that Ortiz had not 
suffered any additional industrial impairment. (R. at 452, 
458-59 and 473.) Although the Medical Panel considered the 
opinions of Dr. Hebertson, the Panel concluded that: 
This patient has failed to demonstrate by objective 
physical findings or roentgenograph^ findings any 
significant progression of his disease since 1976 with 
exception of the spinal fusion which 
mentioned. We are aware that the industrial commis-
sion has settled on a permanent physical impairment of 
25% of the whole person and attributed 5% of that to 
the industrial injury. It is this panel's opinion 
that those determinations are unchanged by our exami-
nation. We specifically have not in 
his disability from 2 to 5% but are aware that has 
already occurred and feel that it has been no change 
from the determinations already made 
added.) 
(R. at 452.) 
Administrative Law Judge, Timothy C. 
because the medical panel had been fully 
opinions of Ortiz' 
opinion increased 
(Emphasis 
Allen determined that 
apprised of the 
treating Physician, Dr. Hebertson, no legitimate purpose would 
be served by conducting a hearing which would only prolong the 
proceedings, especially when "this case involves the classic 
situation where reasonable medical minds can and do differ." 
(R. at 456.) Judge Allen carefully considered the evidence and 
opinions offered by Dr. Hebertson, particularly a May 31, 1984 
letter from Dr. Hebertson, which states: 
Mr. Ortiz' current disability dates from the accident 
of April 6, 1983. He had not been able to work since 
that time. The condition was further aggravated by 
the accident of May 20, 1983. Both accidents were 
superimposed on a prior industrial accident in 1976. 
I think his original industrial condition was gradual-
ly getting worse. It would probably have been 
necessary for him to retire at some point, but the 
accident of last Spring did speed up this process. 
(R. at 458-59.) 
From these statements, Judge Allen properly determined that 
even Dr. Hebertson felt that Ortiz' disability was a result of 
his two automobile accidents and not his previous industrial 
accident of February 19, 1976. (R. at 459.) Although Dr. 
Hebertson speculated that "[i]t would probably have been 
necessary for [Ortiz] to retire at some point . . . ," Dr. 
Hebertson candidly acknowledges that the automobile accidents 
accelerated the process. Because the Commission's findings of 
fact cannot be based on mere speculation (IGA Food Fair v. 
Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978)), and the Medical Panel 
clearly concluded that no additional industrial disability had 
occurred, Judge Allen determined that: 
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The preponderance of the medical evidence on the file 
supports the finding of the medical panel that the 
applicant's current disability is not due to the 
industrial accident of February 19, 1976. 
Emilio R. Ortiz is not currently disabled as a result 
of the industrial accident of February 19, 1976. 
also considered the 
(R. at 459.) 
On review, the Industrial Commission I 
evidence and opinions offered by Dr. Hebertson. The Commission 
noted that "there is insufficient contradiction" between the 
reports of the medical panel and Dr. Hebertson "to warrant a 
cross-examination of the medical panel." (R. at 473.) 
Both reports strongly suggest that any increased 
impairment results from injuries the(applicant 
received in two significant non-industrial automobile 
accidents occurring in 1983. The facts indicate the 
applicant worked after initially recovering from his 
1976 industrial accident up until the first 1983 
automobile accident. The only statement that even 
suggests permanent total disability resulting from the 
1976 industrial accident is the very speculative 
statement of Dr. Hebertson quoted above . . . . 
(R. at 473-74.) In contrast to the speculative opinions of Dr. 
Hebertson the medical panel unequivocally 
believe that his automobile accidents have any relation to his 
industrial injury nor do we feel that hisj 
has increased in the past seven years." 
Because of the limited and speculative nature of Dr 
Hebertson's evidence and the direct posit 
stated "we do not 
industrial disability 
(R. at 473.) 
ion taken by the 
medical panel, the Commission's decision, that any current 
disability suffered by Ortiz did not result from the industrial 
accident is supported by substantial evidence. 
B. The Industrial Commission Properly Concluded that 
Ortiz' Current Disability did not Result From any 
Industrial Accident. 
In the instant case, the evidence supporting the Commis-
sion's finding that Ortiz' industrial disability has not 
increased in seven years is both substantial and abundant. 
With the exception of speculative statements by Dr. Hebertson, 
it is conclusive. 
Ortiz has suffered serious back problems since 1951, when 
he fell in a shower injuring his back and neck. (R. at 
34-35.) In 1957 Ortiz' automobile hit a deer causing another 
low back injury. (R. at 36.) In 1957, Ortiz also suffered a 
sprained back while digging at his home. (R. at 37.) In 1958 
Ortiz suffered an acute lumbar sacral strain. (R. at 37.) In 
1961, Ortiz again suffered back difficulties. He also received 
medical treatment for back injuries from a slip-and-fall 
accident. (R. at 37.) In 1966, Ortiz again injured his back 
while removing a car from a snow bank. (R. at 38-39.) Ortiz 
candidly admits that he has suffered backaches resulting from 
that type of exertion on many occasions. (R. at 39.) Ortiz 
also admitted that he injured his back while lifting a tool box 
at home. Id. 
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was again involved in 
Ortiz was hospitalized 
In 1969, Ortiz slipped and fell agaih injuring his back 
(R. at 39.) In 1970, while a pedestrian^ Ortiz was hit by an 
automobile. (R. 21-22.) In 1975, Ortiz 
an automobile accident in which another Motorist bacKed out of 
a driveway and hit Ortiz' car, re-injuring his back. (R. at 
22-23.) Later in the fall of 1975, Orti^ ; again suffered a back 
injury. (R. at 23.) 
Following the 1976 accident and a 1978 surgery, Ortiz 
returned to work on May 7, 1979. He continued working until 
April 1983, when he was involved in an automobile accident in 
which his back was seriously injured. (#. at 250-56 and 418.) 
As a result of the April, 1983 accident, 
and received medical treatment and therariy. (R. at 251-52.) 
Later, on May 20, 1983 Ortiz was involved in an additional 
automobile accident in which a car behind him failed to stop, 
rear-ending the vehicle in which he was driving. Once again, 
Ortiz was hospitalized and received medicj 
apy for his back injuries. (R. at 253-56| 
automobile accidents, Ortiz did not return to work. (R. at 232 
and 264.) Ortiz admits that the reason hje stopped reporting to 
work on April 7, 1983 was because of back injury sustained in 
the car accidents. Id. 
Under these circumstances and given the "maximum deference" 
given by this Court to facts determined by the Commission, it 
al treatment and ther-
.) After the 1983 
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is clear that substantial evidence supports both the Adminis-
trative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission's conclusion 
that Ortiz' current disability is not a result of any indus-
trial accident, but rather relates directly to non-employment 
injuries. See Wilson, 735 P.2d at 405. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY DENIED 
ORTIZ A DISCRETIONARY MEDICAL PANEL HEARING. 
Ortiz contends that he is entitled to a hearing on his 
objections to the Medical Panel Report. (Ortiz Brief at pp. 
9-11.) Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (Supp. 1987) provides in 
pertinent part that: 
If objections to such report are filed the Commission 
may set the case for hearing to determine the facts 
and issues involved, and at such hearing any party so 
desiring may request the Commission to have the chair-
man of the medical panel present at the hearing for 
examination and cross-examination. (Emphasis added.) 
In 1982, Section 35-1-77 was amended, substituting the phrase 
"the Commission may" for "it shall be the duty of the Commis-
sion to" in the sixth sentence relative to hearings on objec-
tions to medical panel reports. The 1982 amendment makes a 
hearing on objections to a medical panel report discretionary 
with the Commission, properly placing the burden of resolving 
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conflicts in evidence upon the Commission and not upon the 
medical panel. See Price River Coal Co, 
Commission, 731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1986). 
v. Industrial 
[ Ortiz argues that the 
case for hearing when 
applied retrospec-
In a one line unsupported contention) 
pre-1982 duty of the Commission to set a 
there are objections to a medical panel report is applicable in 
the instant case. Ortiz bases his argument on the nebulous 
theory that the 1982 amendment cannot be 
tively because it is substantive rather than procedural. Ortiz 
does not provide any explanation or authority in support of his 
contention. Ortiz' argument is ill founded since the 1982 
procedural amendment governs Ortiz' 1984 
permanent total disability and there is ijo substantial conflict 
in the medical evidence, 
A. The 1982 Amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 Governs 
The Instant Application For Worker's Compensation 
Benefits. 
Where an amendment to a statute changes only procedural law 
application for 
by providing a different mode or form of 
ing already existing substantive rights, 
may be applied retrospectively to accrued 
further the legislature's remedial purposje. See Marshall v 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 704 P.2d 581, 582-83 (Utah 1985) 
procedure for enforc-
the amended statute 
or pending actions to 
-17-
In State v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982), the Utah 
Supreme Court held: 
[Procedural statutes enacted subsequent to the 
initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate, 
or destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only 
to future actions, but also to accrued and pending 
actions as well. (Emphasis added.) 
In this case, the 1982 amendment to Section 77 does not 
enlarge, eliminate or destroy any of applicants' vested or 
contractual rights. The amendment merely changes the procedure 
for enforcing existing rights to obtain workers' compensation 
benefits. The right to obtain a hearing is not destroyed; it 
is merely made discretionary based upon important legislative 
concerns to avoid unnecessary administrative hearings and to 
expedite the process of determining workers' compensation 
issues. 
Application of the 1982 amendment is the only means of 
properly facilitating recovery of existing rights, without 
unduly and unnecessarily prolonging the administrative 
proceedings. As noted by the Commission, 
Considering the facts, which logically point to the 
1983 car accidents as causing any significant increase 
in impairment, and considering the very limited dis-
agreement between Dr. Hebertson and the medical panel, 
and finally considering the fact the medical panel was 
fully aware of Dr. Hebertson's conclusions when the 
medical panel issued its report, the Commission feels 
the Administrative Law Judge correctly denied a 
hearing on objections to the medical panel report. 
The purpose behind having medical panels is to assure 
-18-
there is an unbiased professional assessment of the 
.^nation of the 
cases where 
larity exists or 
relevant medical issues. Cross-exam 
medical panel should be reserved for 
significant disagreement or lack of 
where it is clear the medical panel has not had the 
benefit of some evidence or opinion relevant to the 
medical issues involved. This case is not such a 
case, and therefore, the Commission rinds no further 
hearing is warranted. 
(R. at 473.) 
The hearing sought by Ortiz is merely an evidence 
generating mechanism used by the Commission to resolve 
"'significant disagreement" or "lack of clarity." (R. at 473.) 
In the instant case, there is no significant factual disagree-
ment. Thus, a hearing on objections to the Medical Panel 
Report is nothing more than a simple remedial measure for 
clarifying disputed issues. The 1982 amendment relieves the 
Commission of the burdensome obligation of conducting an 
unnecessary hearing. 
In Marshall v. Industrial Commission,! 704 P. 2d 581 (Utah 
1985), the Utah Supreme Court held that the statute providing 
for interest payments on past-due workers' compensation 
benefits should be applied in an action in which the claimant 
sought benefits for an injury sustained before passage of the 
statute. The Court reasoned that retroactive application of 
the statute was appropriate because it wajs intended to remedy 
the depreciation of the value of benefits 
non-receipt. Marshall, 704 P.2d at 583. 
resulting from 
The Court also noted 
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that the "legislature could only have intended this remedy to 
apply to as broad a range of awards as possible." Id. 
Similarly, in the instant case, retroactive application of 
the 1982 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 is appropriate 
because the amendment is intended to remedy the burdensome task 
of conducting unnecessary medical panel hearings by making such 
hearings discretionary in cases where there are no substantial 
conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. Under such 
circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that: 
Those remedial statutes are applied retrospectively to 
accrued or pending actions to further the legis-
latures' remedial purpose unless a contrary legis-
lative intent is manifested. 
Marshall, 704 P.2d at 582; see generally Pilcher v. State Dept. 
of Soc. Serv., 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983); and State Dept. 
of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982). 
B. No Hearing Was Necessary Because There is No 
Substantial Conflict in the Evidence. 
Although the conclusion of Dr. Herbertson differs from that 
of the Medical Panel, the evidence on which those conclusions 
are based is not in conflict: 
However, looking at both Dr. Herbertson' s report as a 
whole and the medical panel's report as a whole, the 
Commission finds that there is insufficient contradic-
tion between the two reports, regarding the ultimate 
issue of permanent total disability or increased 
impairment resulting from the industrial accident, to 
warrant a cross-examination of the medical panel. 
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(R. at 473.) Ortiz' contention that he is entitled to perma-
nent total disability benefits is almost entirely based on the 
speculative position taken by Dr. Herbertson that he thinks 
Ortiz' "industrial condition would have gradually increased 
leading to the patient's early retirement, even though he had 
not been involved in the automobile accident in 1983." Id. 
Unfortunately the 1983 automobile accident did occur. (R. at 
474.) Any speculation otherwise is not lustification for a 
hearing on objections to a medical report and cannot be the 
basis for a finding of fact. IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 
828, 830 (Utah 1978) (holding that "a finding of fact and 
imposition of liability cannot properly l^e made on a mere 
possibility.") 
POINT III 
BECAUSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CONCLUDED 
THAT ORTIZ' PRESENT DISABILITY DID NOT 
RESULT FROM AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT, THE 
ODD-LOT DOCTRINE IS IRRELEVANT TO THIS 
APPEAL. 
In his brief, Ortiz argues that based 
Doctrine', Ortiz should be awarded permanent total disability 
benefits. The Industrial Commission neve r reached the issue of 
permanent total disability because it determined that there was 
no present disability on the basis of the industrial accident 
Thus, the question of the Odd-Lot Doctrinp is not properly 
before this Court. 
-21-
upon the 'Odd-Lot 
In Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., 622 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 
1980), the Utah Supreme Court noted that: 
This Court has recognized the principle that a workman 
may be found totally disabled if by reason of the 
disability resulting from his [industrial] injury he 
cannot perform work of the general character he was 
performing when injured, or any other work which a 
[person] of his capabilities may be able to do or to 
learn to do . . . (Emphasis added.) 
Unless a particular disability arises from an industrial 
accident, there is no workers' compensation liability. See 1A. 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 100 (1986). For 
example, an individual who suffers a disability as a result of 
non-employment activities, such as an automobile accident, 
cannot claim any disability under the Workers' Compensation 
Act. _Id. It follows that the Odd-Lot Doctrine cannot be 
properly considered for the purpose of establishing permanent 
total disability unless disability results from an industrial 
accident. 
In this case, the Commission concluded that "Ortiz is not 
currently disabled as a result of the industrial accident of 
February 19, 1976." (R. at 459.) Therefore, because Ortiz 
failed to demonstrate any current disability resulting from an 
industrial accident, it follows that he is not entitled to 
compensation under the Act. Thus, the Odd-Lot Doctrine cannot 
be considered. 
-22-
CONCLUSION 
Kennecott respectfully requests that 
Industrial Commission be affirmed in all 
DATED this 20th day of May, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRIS'flENSEN & MARTINEAU 
the decision of the 
respects. 
a^rr 
Attorneys 
Respondent 
fLayrock 
for Defendant/ 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 
MEDICAL PANEL - DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY OF 
COMMISSION TO REFER CASE - FINDINGS 
REPORTS - OBJECTIONS TO REPORT HEARING -
EXPENSES. 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury 
by accident, or for death, arising out of or in the course 
of employment, and where the employer or insurance carrier 
denies liability, the commission may r^fer the medical 
aspects of the case to a medical panel 
commission and having the qualifications generally applica-
ble to the medical panel set forth in Section 35-2-56, 
The medical panel shall then make such 
X-rays and perform such tests, including postmortem 
examinations where authorized by the commission, as it 
may determine and thereafter make a report in writing 
to the commission in a form prescribed 
and also make such additional findings 
may require. The commission shall promptly distribute 
full copies of the report of the panel 
the employer and the insurance carrier 
mail with return receipt requested. Within fifteen days 
after such report is deposited in the tfnited States post 
office, the applicant, the employer or 
may file with the commission objection^ in writing thereto. 
If no objections are so filed within such period, the 
report shall be deemed admitted in evidence and the 
commission may base its finding and decision on the report 
of the panel, but shall not be bound by such report if 
there is other substantial conflicting 
case which supports a contrary finding 
If objections to such report are filed 
may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and 
issues involved, and at such hearing any party so desiring 
may request the commission to have the chairman of the 
medical panel present at the hearing fir examination 
AND 
by the commission, 
as the commission 
to the applicant, 
by registered 
and cross-examination. For good cause 
may order other members of the panel, with or without the 
chairman, to be present at the hearing for examination 
and cross-examination. Upon such hearing the written report 
of the panel may be received as an exhibit but shall 
not be considered as evidence in the c^se except as far 
as it is sustained by the testimony admitted. The expenses 
of such study and report by the medical panel and of their 
appearance before the commission shall be paid out of the 
fund provided for by section 35-1-68. 
A-l 
evidence in the 
by the commission, 
the commission 
shown the commission 
ADDENDUM "B" 
• v SANDY-COTTONWOOD ORTHOPEDICS 
tndy MedkaJ-Profestiofial iMg. 
1434 East 9400 South, Suite 100 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
(801) 571-7061 
IAMB L McENTIRE, fcCD- |EMCO 
CORDON R. KIMiAlL, MO., PC. 
DONALD A. SCHMOT, M.D., PC 
January 28, 
Timothy C. Allen 
Administrative Law Judge 
Workman's Compensation Division 
160 East 300 South 
P 0 Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580 
Dear Judge Allen: 
Cottonwood tyedkal Tower 
' i50 East«5770 South, Suite 160 
* , Mi|rr*y, U?h 84107 
• • <8C1) 26^5353 
iy86* > » » 
RE: Emilio 
This letter is a medical panel report on Mr. Emilic 
commission has directed. The panel convened in my Murray office today 
and Mr. Ortiz was present as well as Doctor Jacksqn Millett and myself. 
Both Doctor Millett and I had ampule time to examijne the three inch thick 
chart on Mr. Ortiz which you had forwarded to us. 
this letter a copy of my brief review of this fil^ 
whatsoever use you would think wise. 
R. Ortiz 
o Ortiz which your 
We have reviewed the multiple letters within the c| 
note the contents of some of these. We note that 
the patient be retired from his heavy work but thalt 
as far as any industrial permanent physical impairment 
hart and specifically 
(Doctor Hargreaves felt 
he gave him a 0 rating 
Doctor Millet and I have reviewed our previous re 
given him initially a 10% rating with 2% due to t 
pbrts and note that we had 
hb industrial injury. 
This rating was considerably less than the rating 
Hebertson who felt that the patient had 15% disabi 
with 10% due to the industrial injury. 
We are also aware of the fact that the patient has 
sequent to our first panel hearing and yet no rupt 
yet a two level fusion was accomplished. 
We were also aware of two industrial hearings, one 
with Joseph C. Folley, Administrative Law Judge, t 
September 11, 1978 with Richard G. Sumsion
 f Admi 
I am enclosing with 
to Doctor Millett for 
given by Doctor Wayne 
lity of his lower spine 
had spinal fusion sub-
iired discs were found and 
dated September 23, 
he second hearing on 
nistrative Law Judge. 
1977 
Results of those meetings were to resolve the discrepancy between the test-
imony of Doctor Hebertson and the medical panel. It was felt by this panel 
that the Administrative Law Judges reached a compromised decision and awarded 
the patient a 5% disability rating due to the industrial injury and had 
increased his total disability 25% from all causesL 
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(Prior to that administrative law decision we had also torwarcied a second 
report indicating that as result of this spinal fusion his total disability 
had increased 20% but still felt that 2% was due to#tp£ ^.i^dvstlr^l'injiir^.) 
o • •• • • • I 2 2 • ! 
»• • • • • • • • j 
This panel also noted that Doctor Boyd Holbrook was aS/are Io£*o«ir* results tind 
our reports and did not feel a need to change our opinion or our rating. 
This panel is also aware of a seven page letter by Doctor Jeff Rohlfing which 
was for the veteran's division but in that he felt the patient was disabled 
but did not give him a precentage of disability. 
With this back ground material reviewed but not described in detail we then 
proceded to discuss the patient's history in person with Mr. Ortiz. He stated 
that after his spinal fusion in 1978 he was unable to return to work for six 
to seven month period, wore a corset during much of that time. 
Eventually he was able to return to his work as a brakeman for Kennecott 
Copper Corporation and continued in that capacity until April, 1983. During 
that period his work was heavy and often he had to lift railroad ties or do 
other heavy work required in his capacity. He also would experience the jarring 
of the train across the union of the tracks. 
He also, as you have stated, was involved in an auto accident on April 3, 1983. 
He apparenlty nearly rolled his car into a ditch and actually had two or three 
episodes all at once. He did not in fact roll the car but nearly did. He was 
able to work a day or two and eventually sought Doctor Hebertson out who admitted 
him, I think April 6, 1983, to St. Mark's Hospital. He had pain in his back 
and'his knees and remained in the hospital about a week. The patient was treated 
conservatively and was eventually discharged from the hospital. 
The patient stated that even before that accident he felt his back bothered by 
the jarring of the track and he was concerned about getting off a moving train 
on irregular surfaces which might have rocks or ice or snow or rain on the ground. 
A second accident occurred about May 22, 1983 when his vehicle was rear-ended 
when he was stopped to avoid a car in front of him. The patient eventually 
required hospitalization beginning about May 27th and remained in the hospital 
about a week. He states that as a result of these two accidents that there is 
no litigation involved. The first accident was involving only himself and the 
second accident involves an offending party who has no insurance. 
The patient stated that he had pain down his legs and that he just has more of 
the same since these two accidents and is more painful. 
He states that he can not carry or lift, has to walk very carefully, stop on 
occasion, difficulty swimming and symptoms increased with Valsalva function, 
etc. He has used Rela, Darvon and Demoral which have helped him somewhat. He 
is also receiving physical therapy three times a week from Robert Green. 
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He states that aside from the previous noted problems rW has pain with coitus, 
since surgery, and has increased pain at nighttime. 
We asked the patient why he did not return to work 
not do the job and implied that he might get killed 
land off a moving train onto regular pavement. 
His current activities involve walking, helping 
house. He does not do lawn mowing or snow shovel 
Current domestic responsibilities include his wif 
has five other children who are married and not lij 
The panel examined Mr. Ortiz on the date noted abdve 
muscled and have strong muscles about arms and le^s 
• • •• • • • • 
Regarding his cervical spine he states it has not b^eq aggjr^ v^ ted fctj £L1 6y 
the accident, but he still has some headaches, son|e ;t.tnnltji^ «£ad*sb«e Jnumtness 
in the left 4th and 5th fingers. 
and he stated that he could 
since he would have to 
his wife somewhat around the 
ing or carry the garbage, 
and daughter age 15. He 
ving at home. 
and seemed to be well 
and spine as well. 
ex Lumbar spine examination reveals that he could fl 
extend spine 5°, abduct 15°. Initial straight led 
formed only 30 to 40° in a sitting position but we 
raise both legs to at least 70°, however the rightj 
the left but it seemed like the endpoint
 w a s not 
his complaint of pain and not spasms which ought tl 
forward only about 30 to 40c 
raising tests could be per-
were eventually able to 
leg caused more pain than 
relached at that point and only 
p be present. 
Muscle power revealed normal dorsal and plantar flex 
right and left calf both measured 15^ inches. The 
flexes revealed 2+ and equal knee jerks respectively 
and a 1+ left ankle jerk. 
Examination of the cervical spine revealed that he 
rotate only 30° and abduct 20°. Again we were noj: 
actualy limit but only what he wanted us to see. 
times when he was not aware we were watching that 
ably more. He had some aching on the left side. 
:ion of his muscles and 
patient's deep tendon re-
and a 2+ right ankle jerk 
could flex 45°, extend 30°, 
convinced that this was the 
In fact we noticed at other 
he rotated his neck consider-
The patient is left handed and left biceps are 12 finches, right 11^ inches. 
Both forearm masses were 11 inches. 
Deep tendon reflexes revealed 2+ and equal biceps and triceps respectively. 
Doctor Millet and I compared current films taken 
three view lumbar spine and a five view cervical 
fusion at L4 to the sacrum with some narrowing at 
generative arthritis at L4 anteriorally. As we c 
with films dated 1978 the only significant differ 
spinal fusion has matured significantly and no 
in 
spine 
my office consisting of a 
and revealed a solid 
5. There is slight de-
oi^ ipared those current 1986 
we could see is the 
ssion of his arthritis. 
ence 
progre 
Films of the cervical spine were obtained which repealed some straightening 
of the cervical spine and degenerative arthritis at C5-6. Perhaps slight 
foraminal narrowing on the left side at C2-3, C3-4J C4-5. 
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Comparing the disc space in the cervical spine is diffycylt to compare because 
there is difference in magnification but general appearance reveals the arthri-
tis is not progressed significantly. 
• • • •• •• • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
It is the opinion of this panel that this patient ha£ *fajlfcd; t£ deftojisfrrate 
by objective physical findings or roentgenographs fiifdiflgS* ahy *sigftificant 
progression of his disease since 1976 with exception of the spinal fusion 
which has already been mentioned. We are aware that the industrial commission 
has settled on a permanent physical impairment of 25% of the whole person and 
attributed 5% of that to the industrial injury. It is this panel's opinion 
that those determinations are unchanged by our examination. We specifically 
have not in opinion increased his disability from 2 to 5% but are aware that 
that has already occurred and feel that it has been no change from the determi-
nations already made. 
The panel further feels that the patient has not been temporarily or totally 
disabled since May 6, 1979 when he returned to work. We do not believe that 
his automobile accidents have any relation to his industrial injury nor do we 
feel that his industrial disability has increased in thes past seven years. 
Respectively submitted. 
Sincerely, 
^^L^C^d{ZZZ\H^ 
E. McEntire, M.D. 
of the Medical Panel, 
JEM/mdl 
Enclosures 
mb 
llett, M.D. 
P.S. The panel is aware that Doctor Hebertson felt that he had a 5% increased 
disability over time but the panel does not concur with that. The panel is 
also trying to determine if Doctor Hebertson himself made an error since he 
had rated him about 30% disabled about seven years ago and still has him 30% 
disabled but implies an additional 5% increase. 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
Case No. 84000914 
o 4 
UTAH 
6'/ 
EMILIO R. ORTIZ, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORP. (self 
insured) and/or SECOND INJURY 
FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake city, Utah, on November 6, 
1985, at 8:30 a.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
to Order and Notice of the Commission, 
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge 
The applicant was present and represented by Susan B. 
Diana, Attorney at Law. 
The defendant, Kennecott, i^ as represented by J. R. 
Shields, Personnel Manager. 
The Second Injury Fund wa^ 
Boorman, Administrator. 
represented by Erie V. 
At the conclusion of the Evidentiary Hearing, the matter was referred 
to a medical panel appointed by the Administrative) Law Judge. The medical 
panel report was received and copies were distributed to the parties. The 
applicant, by and through counsel, filed objections to the medical panel 
report and also requested a hearing. In reviewing Section 77 of the Act, as 
amended, the Administrative Law Judge notes that that Section provides that 
the Commission may schedule a hearing on the objections to a medical panel 
report. It is the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that the amendment 
to Section 77 was a procedural rather than substanitive amendment, and as such 
the present provisions apply. Further, the Administrative Law Judge has not 
been presented with any new medical evidence different than that which has 
already been submitted by the applicant's treating physician, Dr. Wayne 
Hebertson. The medical panel has been fully apprised of the treating 
physician's views in the matter, and no legitimate purpose would be served by 
prolonging the proceedings. Rather, this case involves the classic situation 
where reasonable medical minds can and do differ. Further medical testimony 
would not provide any more assistance to the Administrative Law Judge in 
resolving the matter. Having thoroughly reviewed the matter and the medical 
r-i 
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panel report in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the 
objections to the medical panel report should be rejected and the medical 
panel report is hereby admitted into evidence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Emilio Ortiz sustained a compensable industrial accident on February 
19, 1976 while working for Kennecott. At that time, he was lifting a 8 foot 
by 1 foot square railroad tie, weighing in excess of 100 pounds, when he 
experienced a sudden onset of back difficulties. He eventually required a 
back fusion in September of 1978. Following an evidentiary hearing and a 
hearing on objections to the medical panel report, the Commission entered its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order finding that the applicant had 
sustained a 5% permanent partial impairment due to the industrial accident of 
February 19, 1976, and an additional 10% impairment due to pre-existing lumbar 
problems, and an additional 10% due to pre-existing cervical problems, for a 
total award of 25% of the whole person. These benefits were awarded and paid 
to the applicant. 
On or about May 7, 1979 the applicant returned to work at-Kennecott 
after receiving his lumbar fusion from Dr. Boyd Holbrook on September 27, 
1978. The applicant testified that when he returned to work he was still 
having back pain and the doctor instructed him not to lift or bend. The 
applicants job as a brakeman involved heavy work, since there was no light 
work available. The applicant continued to work since he had a family to 
support. The applicant testified that following his injury but prior to April 
1 of 1983, he was getting worse and he was unable to jump off trains anymore. 
The applicant was receiving treatment from Dr. Hargreaves and Dr. Hebertson, 
which consisted of physical therapy, which was prescribed by both of the 
doctors, and he was also taking muscle relaxers which had been given to him by 
Dr. Hebertson. 
On April 3, 1983 Mr. Ortiz was on his way to work when he hit some 
black ice before he arrived at Copperton. His car spun three or four times 
and he eventually landed in a ditch. As a result, he had pain in his head, 
neck, and low back. He also had a worsening of leg pain after this accident. 
He was seen by Dr. Hebertson on April 6, 1983 and at that time the doctor made 
arrangements to hospitalize him, which was accomplished on April 10, 1983. 
The applicant received an x-ray, CT scan, EKG, and EEG along with bed rest 
while in the hospital. He was subsequently discharged on April 15, 1983. The 
applicant started losing time from Kennecott on April 3, 1983 and has not 
worked since. 
On May 20, 1983 the applicant was southbound on 200 South in his 
automobile, when a car ahead stopped which forced him to stop also. The car 
behind him did not see the applicant stopped, and so he rear-ended him, 
although the applicant stated that the car was not going very fast. The 
applicant had a lot of pain in his back again and had worsening of leg pain. 
He was hospitalized on May 27, 1983 at the St. Mark's Hospital by Dr. 
Hebertson, and was given physical therapy, x-rays and bed rest. 
EMILIO ORTIZ 
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On March 30, 198A the applicant was examined 
he had requested retirement from Kennecott on 
Hargreaves indicates in his notes that the applicant 
unable to climb trains any more, and the doctor found 
100% disabled from performing his job at Kennecott 
disability was not due to the industrial injury of 
Dr. Hargreaves found that the applicant's problems 
1950fs, and that he had a progressive degenerative 
also found that the automobile accident of April 3 J 
aggravation of the applicant's low back problems 
accident of May 20, 1983. The applicant also indicated 
that he had lost consciousness as a result of the 
With respect to prior problems, the applicant served 
1951 as an MP. The applicant fell in a shower, and 
back, and as a result was given a medical discharge 
by Dr. Hargreaves, since 
disability basis. Dr. 
was complaining of being 
that the applicant was 
but that his current 
February 19, 1976. Rather, 
had dated back to the 
process. Dr. Hargreaves 
1983 constituted an acute 
as did the automobile 
on cross-examination 
April 3, 1983 accident. 
in the Army in 1950 and 
hurt his neck and lumbar 
The applicant's present complaints are that he has constant pain in 
his back and legs and that he is unable to climb a ladder and that he has 
fallen twice while doing so. He also has pain in his knees from a hit and run 
accident he sustained in 1970, and he also complains that his right little and 
ring fingers are numb. The applicant also complains that he has headaches, 
which Dr. Hargreaves noted that started after his automobile accident of May 
20, 1983. The applicant also stated that walking causes knee and back pain, 
and that he can sit for one or two hours before he must get up and move around. 
With the file in this posture, the case Was referred to a medical 
panel for the purpose of determining if there had been any increase in the 
permanent partial impairment due to the industrial injury of February 19, 1976 
beyond the 5% already awarded and paid. In addition, the panel was also asked 
if there had been any temporary total disability since May 6, 1979, the date 
to which the applicant had already been compensated, as a result of the 
industrial accident of February 19, 1976. The medical panel answered both of 
the inquiries in the negative. The panel was of thd opinion that there was no 
objective physical findings or x-ray findings of any significant progression 
of the applicant's disease since the performance of his spinal fusion in 
1978. The panel concluded that the applicant has not been temporarily and 
totally disabled since May 6, 1979 as a result of the industrial accident, and 
that his impairment due to the industrial injury has 
has already been awarded. The Administrative Law Jupge adopts the findings of 
the medical panel as his own. 
In adopting the findings of the medical pan^ 
Judge is mindful of the evidence and opinions 
Administrative Law Judge feels the need to comment 
Specifically, the letter of May 31, 1984. At that 
as follows: 
Mr. Ortiz1 current disability dates 
6, 1983. He had not been able to wc^ rk 
condition was further aggravated by 
C-3 
1, the Administrative Law 
of Dr. Hebertson. The 
on some of that evidence. 
time, Dr. Hebertson stated 
from the accident of April 
since that time. The 
the accident of May 20, 
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1983. Both accidents were superimposed on a prior industrial 
accident in 1976. I think his original industrial condition was 
gradually getting worse. It would probably have been necessary 
for him to retire at some point, but the accident of last Spring 
did speed up this process. 
From the foregoing, it is clear to the Administrative Law Judge that 
the applicant'5 treating physician, Dr. Hebertson felt that the applicant's 
current disability was a result of his two automobile accidents and not his 
industrial accident of February 19, 1976. The doctor acknowledges that the 
automobile accidents speeded up the applicant's condition. The doctor 
indicates that it probably would have been necessary for him to retire at some 
point due to the industrial injury, but the doctor begs the question in this 
regard. Because by the same token, it is just as probable that the applicant 
would not have been required to retire. Be that as it may, the Administrative 
Law Judge finds that the preponderance of the medical evidence on the file 
supports the finding of the medical panel that the applicant's current 
disability is not due to the industrial accident of February 19, 1976. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: i* -
Emilio R. Ortiz is not currently disabled as a result of the 
industrial accident of February 19, 1976. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Emilio R. Ortiz for 
permanent total disability benefits as a result of his industrial accident of 
February 19f 1976 while employed by Kennecott should be, and the same is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Passed by the Industrial Commissi© 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, t 
SV^t day of March, 1986• 
ATTEST: 
Linda J. Strasburg, Commission Secretary 
r.-A 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on March , 1986 a copy of the attached ORDER 
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ADDENDUM " D " 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No* 
EMILIO R. ORTIZ, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
KBNNECOTT COPPER CORP. 
(SELF-INSURED) and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
DENIAL OF 
MOTION FOR 
REVIEW 
On March 24, 1986, an Administrative Law 
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
the above-captioned case permanent total disabilit; 
Judge of the Commission 
denying the applicant in 
y and further permanent 
partial impairment benefits. The Administrative Law Judge adopted the 
findings of the medical "panel that the applicant's impairment had not 
increased beyond the 25% whole person rating that was assessed in 1980. The 
Administrative Law Judge disallowed the counsel for the applicant's request 
for a hearing on objections to the medical panel report. The Administrative 
Law Judge concluded that it was within his discretion whether or not to 
conduct a hearing on objections to the medical panel report, and the 
Administrative Law Judge determined no hearing was warranted as the medical 
panel had all the medical evidence before it when ii rendered its decision. 
On April 18, 1986, the counsel for the applicant filed a Motion for Review 
contesting the Administrative Law Judge*s refusal to allow a hearing on 
objections to the medical panel report. The counsel tor the applicant stated 
that, considering the fact the applicant's treating pnysician found increased 
impairment and possibly permanent total disability resulting from the 1976 
industrial accident, cross-examination of the medical (panel was warranted and 
necessary to test the reliability of the medical panel conclusions. The 
Commission is of the opinion that cross-examination pf the medical panel in 
this case is not justifiable. 
The counsel for the applicant points to the treating physician's 
conclusions as being supportive of a finding of permanent total disability or 
at least supportive of a finding of increased impairment. The counsel for the 
applicant concludes that this different conclusion from that of the medical 
panel warrants a cross-examination of the medical panel to ascertain the 
panel's basis for their decision. The Commission agrees that the treating 
physician's conclusions and those of the medical panel are somewhat at odds, 
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but the Commission does not find the two conclusions totally contradictory. 
Dr. Hebertson, the treating physician, does seem to suggest that permanent 
total disability could possibly have occurred as a result of the 1976 
industrial accident. He states "I also think that the industrial condition 
would have gradually increased leading to the patient*s early retirement, even 
though he had not been involved in the automobile accident in 1983/* However, 
this statement is rather speculative, and comes after a more lengthly 
discussion of how two non-industrial 1983 car accidents contributed to the 
applicant's impaired condition. The Commission does not find this statement 
to be a clear conclusion on the part of Dr. Hebertson that the applicant was 
permanently totally disabled as result of the 1976 industrial accident. 
Looking at the medical panel report, the medical panel concludes, "We 
do not believe that his automobile accidents have any relation to his 
industrial injury nor do we feel that his industrial disability has increased 
in the past seven years/* This statement more clearly rules out increased 
impairment or permanent total disability resulting from the industrial 
accident than does Dr. Hebertson*s report. However, looking at both Dr. 
Hebertson*s report as a whole and the medical panel's report as a whole, the 
Commission finds that there is insufficient contradiction between the two 
reports, regarding the ultimate issue of permanent total disability or 
increased impairment resulting from the industrial accident, to warrant a 
cross-examination of the medical panel. Both reports strongly suggest that 
any increased impairment results from injuries the applicant received in two 
significant non-industrial automobile accidents occurring in 1983. The facts 
indicate the applicant worked after initially recovering from his 1976 
industrial accident up until the first 1983 automobile accident. The only 
statement that even suggests permanent total disability resulting from the 
1976 industrial accident is the very speculative statement of Dr. Hebertson 
quoted above, and Dr. Hebertson and the medical panel differ only 5% in what 
increase in impairment occurred before the 1983 car accident. 
Considering the facts, which logically point to the 1983 car 
accidents as causing any significant increase in impairment, and considering 
the very limited disagreement between Dr. Hebertson and the medical panel, and 
finally considering the fact the medical panel was fully aware of Dr. 
Hebertson's conclusions when the medical panel issued its report, the 
Commission feels the Administrative Law Judge correctly denied a hearing on 
objections to the medical panel report. The purpose behind having medical 
panels is to assure there is an unbiased professional assessment of the 
relevant medical issues. Cross-examination of the medical panel should be 
reserved for cases where significant disagreement or lack of clarity exists or 
where it is clear the medical panel has not had the benefit of some evidence 
or opinion relevant to the medical issues involved. This case is not such a 
case, and therefore, the Commission finds no further hearing is warranted. 
D-2 
EMILIO ORTIZ 
ORDER 
PAGE THREE 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's April 18, 1986 Motion 
for Review is hereby denied and the Administrative Law Judge's March 24, 1986 
Order is hereby affirmed. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
/f** day of June 1986. 
Lenice L, Nielsen, Commissioner 
ATTEST: 
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